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Restraints of the Body or of the Mind: Conflicting
Interpretations of the Physical Restraint Sentencing
Enhancement
Introduction
Imagine two criminal defendants, Defendant A and Defendant B.
Defendant A committed a bank robbery in Georgia.1 During the course of
the robbery, he forced the employees at gunpoint to empty their cash
drawers and open the safe.2 During this interaction, Defendant A never
made physical contact with any of the victims.3 Soon after, he was arrested
and tried in federal court. The trial court instituted a two-level sentencing
enhancement for using physical restraint during the commission of a
robbery.4 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld this enhancement,
concluding that the presence of a gun “ensured the victims’ compliance and
effectively prevented them from leaving the room.”5
Defendant B committed a bank robbery in New York.6 At gunpoint, he
instructed the employees to get on the floor and proceeded to steal over half
a million dollars.7 After he was arrested, he was tried in federal court. As in
the previous case, the trial court instituted a two-level enhancement for
using physical restraint during the commission of a robbery.8 On appeal, the
Second Circuit disagreed with the physical restraint enhancement, vacated
the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.9 The Second Circuit held that
for this enhancement to apply, there must be “a restraint of movement by
the use of some artifact by which the victim is ‘tied’ or ‘bound’ . . . or by
the use of a space where the victim is ‘locked up.’”10 So, although
Defendant A and Defendant B committed very similar crimes, they suffered
two significantly different punishments based on the circuit in which they
were sentenced.

1. See United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1514 (11th Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 1515.
3. Id. at 1518.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1519.
6. See United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1999).
7. Id. at 157.
8. Id. at 156–57.
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id. at 164; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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To prevent disparity in punishments for similar crimes, like those in the
hypotheticals above, Congress implemented federal sentencing guidelines
under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”).11 The hope was to
create more certainty and fairness in federal criminal sentencing.12 Under
this new sentencing regime, a judge may apply additional sentencing
enhancements that move the offense level up or down, leading to longer or
shorter sentences.13 Sentencing enhancements are applied for specific
offenses, different from the elements of the crime charged, that are
committed in furtherance of a crime. For example, for the crime of robbery,
there is an enhancement for physical restraint.14 This provision states “if
any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense
or to facilitate escape, increase by [two] levels.”15
A robbery is committed if a person unlawfully takes the personal
property of another against the victim’s will “by means of actual or
threatened force.”16 If the defendant restrained the victim during the
robbery, he could be punished for the crime of robbery and receive the
additional sentencing enhancement for the act of restraint.17 According to
the Sentencing Guidelines, robbery has a base offense level of twenty,
which requires a minimum sentence of thirty-three to forty-one months’
imprisonment.18 The two-level physical restraint enhancement raises the
base offense level to twenty-two, increasing the minimum sentence to fortyone to fifty-one months’ imprisonment.19
Currently there is a circuit split on how to interpret this enhancement.
One interpretation holds a strict reading of the guideline text and requires a
literal physical restraint (e.g., the victim is tied up, locked in a room, or
otherwise physically immobilized).20 The other interpretation holds that
11. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited
Feb. 9, 2022).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2.
14. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
15. Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1).
17. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
18. See id. ch. 5, pt. A, sent’g tbl.
19. See id.; id. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the
defendant physically restrained the victim by standing on his neck, effectively immobilizing
him while defendant robbed him); United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss4/9

2022]

COMMENTS

797

psychological anguish or coercion, brought about by being threatened with
a gun, is enough to establish physical restraint.21 The discrepancy of these
two interpretations goes directly against the fairness and certainty goals of
the SRA because the same act is punished differently simply based on the
governing circuit. Congress wanted uniformity in federal sentencing based
on the defendant’s conduct, and this conflict in interpretation eviscerates
that goal by creating two different standards of punishment for the same
act.
This Comment explores the competing interpretations of the physical
restraint enhancement for the crime of robbery. Part I discusses the history
and goal of the SRA. Part II examines the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth,
and D.C. Circuits, which follow the strict interpretation approach. This
approach does not allow the enhancement to be applied for mere
psychological restraint, but rather requires a literal physical restraint. Part
III analyzes the First, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which
apply a more liberal interpretation of this enhancement in which the
psychological effect of being held at gunpoint constitutes physical restraint.
Part IV examines the conflict between these two interpretations and
discusses which interpretation better furthers the goals of the SRA. This
Comment concludes that a strict reading of the guideline text—which
requires actual restraint—is the appropriate application of this enhancement
for there to be consistency in criminal sentencing.
I. A Brief History
A. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Before Congress enacted the SRA, sentences were determined
exclusively by the judge and parole officer.22 The sentencing judge and
2001) (holding that the defendant physically restrained the victim by holding her by her
hair); United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49, 61 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the defendant did
not physically restrain the victim when he merely pointed a gun at him and threw him to the
ground).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that
forcing victims at gunpoint into another room was a physical restraint because the “presence
of handguns ensured the victims’ compliance”); United States v. Stevens, 580 F.3d 718, 721
(8th Cir. 2009) (holding that ordering victims to the ground at gunpoint and moving them to
two distinct locations was a physical restraint); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1236
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that blocking the exit while threatening victims with a gun was a
physical restraint).
22. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
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defendant’s parole officer considered “their own assessments of the
offender’s amenability to rehabilitation” to determine the appropriate
sentence.23 This sentencing scheme aimed to rehabilitate the defendant in
the hope that he would not return to criminal activity upon release.24
Typically, appellate courts gave “virtually unconditional deference” to the
sentencing judge’s decision, because the “sentencing judge ‘sees more and
senses more’ than the appellate court.”25 In this sentencing structure the
broad discretion of judges came through a “three-way sharing” system.26
Under this system, Congress set the maximum punishment, the judge
“imposed a sentence within the statutory range,” and the parole officer
could provide the judge a report with additional information about the
convicted defendant to aid in applying a proper sentence. 27 The judge was
not confined to the sole issue of guilt; rather, the judge could consider the
entirety of the defendant’s circumstances (such as the defendant’s life and
characteristics) to implement an appropriate punishment.28 This led to wide
variations in punishment because each sentence was highly subjective.29
Originally, the criminal justice system sought to “achieve fundamental
changes in the characters, personalities, and attitudes of convicted
offenders” through criminal punishments.30 This rehabilitative ideal was the
“dominant American theory of penal treatment” through the mid-1960s.31
Courts began to move away from considering rehabilitation to be the goal
of sentencing based on findings that it was an unattainable goal.32 As
society changed, so did the view of criminal sentencing. For example, the
family structure dissolved, with government becoming far more involved in
child-rearing than it ever had been before.33 More families relied on public
schooling, and the family as an economic unit began to diminish with the

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 364.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 365; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
28. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
29. See id.
30. Francis A. Allen, Address, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal in American
Criminal Justice, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 148 (1978).
31. Id. at 149.
32. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365 (citing NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT
24–43 (1974) and FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981)).
33. Allen, supra note 30, at 153–54.
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industrializing society.34 With government becoming more pervasive in
public life, people began to defer to the discretion of public officials.35 As
social functions changed, so too did the criminal justice system. Society as
whole also saw less value in rehabilitation of criminals and was more
concerned “that criminal penalties [were] vigorously imposed.”36 This shift
was due to the lack of change in the recidivism rate.37
While rehabilitation remains a goal of the criminal justice system, the
punishment’s goal now also includes retribution, deterrence, and protection
of the population.38 As courts moved away from focusing on rehabilitation,
Congress began to address the issue of wide disparities in the sentences
being imposed. Ultimately, Congress created the United States Sentencing
Commission under the SRA to address this issue.39
The Commission’s goal was to limit the inconsistency of punishments
for federal offenders by establishing federal sentencing guidelines to
encapsulate criminal conduct.40 This system attempted to create “an
effective, fair sentencing system” based on honesty, uniformity, and
proportionality.41 Under the old sentencing structure there was confusion
due to the inconsistency of imposed sentences. Offenders usually served
about one-third of the sentence imposed by the court because the parole
board had the authority to set the actual term of imprisonment—which was
often less than the court’s sentence.42 The new sentencing structure
implemented by the Commission abolished parole.43 So now, the sentence
imposed by the court is the sentence the offender serves.44
Under the new Guidelines, sentences are determined by the offense
conduct (i.e., the crime) and the defendant’s criminal history.45 Each
34. Id.
35. Id. at 155.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 156.
38. Stanley A. Cohen, An Introduction to the Theory, Justifications and Modern
Manifestations of Criminal Punishment, 27 MCGILL L.J. 73, 74 (1981).
39. About, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about-page (last visited Oct. 7,
2021).
40. See id.
41. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (“[T]he abolition of parole makes the sentence imposed by the court the sentence
the offender will serve, less approximately fifteen percent for good behavior.”).
45. See id. pt. A.2.
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offense conduct includes a base offense level pre-determined by the
Commission.46 The criminal history category is based off the defendant’s
prior criminal conduct. Courts refer to the Sentencing Table to determine
months of imprisonment.47 This table lists offense levels of 1 to 43 on the
Y-axis and criminal history categories of I to VI on the X-axis.48 The judge
imposes a sentence within the range found at the intersection of the axes.
However, the Commission recognized that a chart could not classify every
possible criminal act; therefore, courts are permitted to “depart from a
guideline-specified sentence only when it finds ‘an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance . . . not adequately taken into consideration . . . that
should result in a sentence different from that described.’”49
In 1989, the constitutionality of the Guidelines was challenged in
Mistretta v. United States. The defendant claimed that the Commission
itself “was constituted in violation of the established doctrine of separation
of powers, and that Congress delegated excessive authority to the
Commission to structure the Guidelines.”50 The defendant argued that
Congress granted excessive legislative discretion to another branch of
government in violation of the nondelegation doctrine.51 This doctrine
“mandate[s] that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to
another Branch.”52 However, the Court noted that this does not “prevent
Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.”53 In this
case, Congress did not give the Commission free reign to develop the
Guidelines on its own. Congress gave detailed guidance for every step of
the development process, such as formulation of offense categories, length
of sentencing ranges, and directives on maximum sentences.54 The Court
held that “there [was no] absence of standards for the guidance of the
Administrator’s action”; therefore, the nondelegation doctrine was not
violated.55 The delegation of authority was “sufficiently specific and
detailed to meet constitutional requirements.”56
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id. ch. 2, introductory cmt.
Id. ch. 5, pt. A, introductory cmt., sentencing tbl.
Id.
Id. ch. 1, pt. A1.4(b) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
Minstretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id. at 374–77.
Id.
Id. at 374.
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The Court rejected the notion that the branches of government “must be
entirely separate and distinct” in response to the defendant’s claim that the
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine.57 Rather, the
Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity.”58 In Mistretta, the defendant claimed that
Congress delegated authority to the Judiciary that had only ever been
exercised by Congress or the Executive.59 This upset the balance of power
by requiring judges to cooperate with a political entity to create the
Guidelines, thus merging the Judiciary into a political, or legislative, role.60
The Court disagreed and held that this delegation of authority did not
violate the separation of powers.61 The Court has recognized two dangers in
regard to cases that involve the Judiciary: “first, that the Judicial Branch
neither be assigned nor allowed ‘tasks that are more properly accomplished
by [other] branches,’”62 and “second, that no provision of law
‘impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial
Branch.’”63 The Commission did not threaten these concerns, and the Court
held that it was constitutional.64
In 2005, the Guidelines’ constitutionality was challenged based on the
mandatory minimum sentencing it prescribed in United States v. Booker.65
The Court held that while the Guidelines under the SRA are constitutional,
they are merely advisory, not required.66 The SRA requires the sentencing
court to consider the Guidelines’ ranges as set forth by the Commission, but
courts are permitted “to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns as well.”67 A sentencing court may depart from the Guidelines and
implement a different sentence as long as the court fully explains the reason
for the departure.68 Before the SRA, appealing a sentence was very difficult
57. Id. at 380.
58. Id. at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1983) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
59. Id. at 383–84.
60. Id. at 383.
61. Id. at 384.
62. Id. at 383 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 656 (1988)).
63. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986)).
64. Id. at 384.
65. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

802

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:795

due to the deference appellate courts gave to trial courts; now, appellate
courts review under the abuse-of-discretion standard.69 Defendants can
appeal a sentence for the following reasons: (1) to determine if the
Guidelines were correctly applied, or (2) if the court departed from the
Guidelines, to determine “the reasonableness of the departure.”70
Congress had three goals in implementing the SRA: (1) to “enhance the
ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effective,
fair sentencing system”; (2) to have “reasonable uniformity in sentencing
by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal
offenses committed by similar offenders”; and (3) to have “proportionality
in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different
sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.”71 When circuits differ
on how to implement the Guidelines or enhancements, these goals are
lost.72 Different sentences for similar crimes are imposed based on the
conflicting interpretations, leading to a disparity in sentencing.73
B. Issues with Physical Restraint Enhancement
The crime of robbery has several enhancements that courts can apply to
adjust the sentence based on additional acts committed in furtherance of the
robbery. Physical restraint is one such enhancement, and it allows for a
two-level adjustment to the base offense level of robbery.74 The way this
enhancement has been applied among the circuits has led to inconsistencies
in sentencing that are antithetical to the SRA’s objective. For example,
some circuits apply this enhancement only when a defendant physically
immobilizes the victim through physical contact during the commission of a
robbery; other circuits, however, apply the enhancement when a defendant
threatens his victim with a gun during the robbery. This is an important
issue because the differing interpretations lead to a two-level sentencing
disparity for the same or similar crime, which is what the Commission
sought to avoid when instituting the Guidelines.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that during the commission of a
robbery, “if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission
of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase [sentencing] by [two]
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996).
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A1.2.
Id. pt. A1.3.
See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 11.
See supra notes 20–21.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
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levels.”75 The issue here is how to interpret the words “physical restraint.”
The circuits that follow a strict interpretation of this language hold that the
victim must literally be physically restrained (e.g., bound, tied, locked
up).76 In contrast, the circuits that follow a liberal interpretation of the
language allow for the victims’ psychological feelings of being restrained
(e.g., being threatened with a gun) to be a factor in determining if the
enhancement is appropriate.77 To limit this discrepancy of sentencing
practices, the circuits need to be unified in their interpretation of this
enhancement.
II. A Strict Interpretation of the Physical Restraint Enhancement
Circuits in the strict interpretation category adhere to a textual approach
for the phrase “physical restraint” and require the victim to have been
physically affected by the defendant for this enhancement to apply.
A. The Second Circuit
In United States v. Rosario, the defendant, William Rosario, assaulted a
postal worker when he was delivering mail.78 After knocking the postal
worker to the ground, Rosario stood on his throat and stole his wallet and
keys.79 A few days later, Rosario was arrested.80 He gave the police a credit
card as a form of identification, but the credit card had someone else’s
name on it.81 He had acquired the credit card by using the postal worker’s
keys to steal from mailboxes.82 The postal worker then identified Rosario
from a photo array as the man who had robbed him, and Rosario was
convicted.83 During sentencing, the trial court imposed a two-level
sentencing enhancement for physical restraint for the act of Rosario
standing on the postal worker’s neck.84
On appeal, Rosario argued the district court improperly applied the twolevel enhancement for physical restraint during the commission of a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
See supra note 20.
See supra note 21.
7 F.3d 319, 320 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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robbery.85 First, Rosario contended that two enhancements the court applied
to his sentence resulted in double counting.86 Double counting occurs when
a defendant is sentenced for a crime and receives an additional
enhancement for an act that is an included element in the original charge.87
Here, Rosario claimed that the use of force element for a robbery was
essentially the same as physical restraint.88 Therefore, sentencing him for
both would be double counting.89 The Second Circuit disagreed with
Rosario’s application of the enhancement. The court noted that he
“ignore[d] the difference between the use of force in committing a robbery,
and forcible restraint of a victim’s mobility in order to facilitate the
crime.”90 And, if physical restraint were meant to be an element of robbery,
the Guidelines would not have included it as an enhancement distinct from
the elements of the crime.91
Second, Rosario argued that he did not truly physically restrain the postal
worker. He claimed that to apply this enhancement, one must use “some
device or means of restraint beyond manual holding” to confine a victim.92
His actions, he argued, were “mere physical contact” and did not rise to the
level of physical restraint.93 The Second Circuit disagreed with this
assertion as well: “[T]he victim ‘could do nothing about [his] situation
because of the physical restraint.’”94 Even though the victim was not
restrained by an object, he was still physically affected to the point that he
had no choice but to comply. Therefore, the Second Circuit upheld the
district court’s finding that Rosario had physically restrained the postal
worker by standing on his neck.95
In United States v. Paul, Wensley Paul and his codefendants robbed a
pharmacy.96 During the robbery, one of Paul’s codefendants threatened the
clerk with a gun and ordered him not to move.97 The codefendant then
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 320–21.
See id. at 321.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Id.
904 F.3d 200, 201 (2d Cir. 2018).
Id.
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gestured toward another clerk with the gun and forced him to open the cash
register.98 The codefendants then took the cash and other items before
leaving the store.99 Paul served as a lookout throughout the robbery, and
after he was arrested, Paul pled guilty to the robbery charge.100 The district
court then imposed the physical restraint enhancement over Paul’s
objection. Paul appealed, arguing that the physical restraint enhancement
was improperly applied.101
The Second Circuit held that the enhancement was improper because,
otherwise, “virtually every robbery would be subject to the [two]-level
enhancement for physical restraint unless it took place in unoccupied
premises.”102 Additionally, the court relied on its holding in United States v.
Anglin. In Anglin, the defendant robbed a bank at gunpoint.103 The Second
Circuit held that “displaying a gun and telling people to get down and not to
move, without more, is insufficient” for the physical restraint
enhancement.104
The court also relied on the commentary to the Guidelines in which the
Commission included acts such as tying, binding, or locking the victim up
to illustrate the intent of the enhancement.105 Expanding on the precedent
set in Anglin and the Guidelines commentary, the Paul court agreed with
the Second Circuit that though these acts may not include every possible
physical restraint, they are “intended as meaningful signposts . . . to
understand[] the Sentencing Commission’s enhancement purpose.”106 Since
there was no actual contact between the defendant or his codefendants and
the victims, the physical restraint enhancement was improperly applied.107
B. The Third Circuit
In United States v. Copenhaver, Brian Copenhaver robbed a hotel and
assaulted a hotel employee with a gun.108 During the robbery, the defendant
never used physical contact to restrict the victim’s movement, but the court
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 201–02.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id. at 203 (quoting United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999)).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 201, 204.
185 F.3d 178, 179 (3d Cir. 1999).
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still held that the physical restraint enhancement applied.109 Copenhaver
struck the hotel employee in the head with the gun, made the employee
enter another office, and then forced the employee into a fireplace and
placed a screen across it.110 Copenhaver was arrested, convicted, and
sentenced for the crime—which included a two-level enhancement for
physical restraint.111 The issue on appeal was whether the act of forcing the
employee into the fireplace at gunpoint constituted physical restraint as per
the Guidelines.112
Copenhaver argued that his actions were not a physical restraint because
the Guidelines “require[] an exertion of physical force upon the victim.”113
The Third Circuit disagreed and stated that “[n]o actual touching is required
to effect physical restraint.”114 The purpose of forcing the victim into the
fireplace was to prevent him from interfering with the crime or calling for
help.115 The victim “was confined to the fireplace and had no alternative but
compliance.”116 The court also noted that “the fact that the barrier was not
impenetrable does not negate physical restraint.”117 Rather, “[i]t is the
perpetrator’s act of enclosing or confining the victim in a space or with a
barrier, actual or threatened,” that determines physical restraint.118 The
court held that the “act of enclosing or confining the victim in a space or
with a barrier” is enough to apply the physical restraint enhancement.119
Though the defendant did not physically touch the victim, he was
physically immobilized by being confined in the fireplace.120
C. The Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Garcia, Jaime Garcia and two other defendants
robbed a gun store in Lubbock, Texas, and left with nine stolen firearms.121
During the robbery, the robbers ordered an employee to get on the floor by
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 183.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 182–83.
857 F.3d 708, 710 (5th Cir. 2017).
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holding a gun to his head.122 Another defendant, also armed with a firearm,
stood near the exit while the third defendant smashed display cases to steal
the enclosed firearms.123 An employee in the backroom heard the sound of
breaking glass and ran to the front of the store.124 A gunfight ensued,
resulting in one employee being shot in the ankle and the defendants’
escaping.125 Garcia was eventually arrested and charged with robbery, and
the court applied the two-level physical restraint enhancement.126
However, both the government and defense objected to this
enhancement, noting the Fifth Circuit’s precedent in United States v.
Hickman.127 In Hickman, the court held that “merely brandishing a weapon
at a victim cannot support an enhancement under this section of the
Guidelines.”128 Here, one of the defendants, Markus Chopane, conducted a
series of group robberies while armed with a gun.129 Each of these robberies
occurred in a similar manner. Chopane and various assailants would hold a
store employee at gunpoint and demand the employee give them the cash
that was in the safe and tills.130 After arrest, Chopane admitted that during
one of these robberies he had held a gun and “tapped” an employee on the
shoulder with it, but he argued that he never tied up, bound, or locked up
victims to warrant the enhancement.131 The Fifth Circuit noted that if it
were to hold that brandishing a weapon were a physical restraint, “there
would be no limiting principle on the application of this enhancement;
every armed robbery would be enhanced by the physical restraint
provision.”132
Regardless of this precedent, the district court in Garcia adopted the
parole officer’s pre-sentence report, which included the physical restraint
enhancement.133 Garcia appealed on the grounds that this enhancement was
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461 (5th Cir. 1998), reh’g
granted and vacated, United States v. Hickman, 165 F.3d 1020 (5th Cir. 1999), aff’d in part
and vacated in part, United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999)).
129. Hickman, 151 F.3d at 451.
130. See id. at 451–52.
131. Id. at 461.
132. Id. at 461–62.
133. Garcia, 857 F.3d at 710.
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improperly applied.134 The Fifth Circuit agreed.135 The court noted that
examples of physical restraint in the Guidelines “involve[] a restraint of
movement by the use of some artifact by which the victim is ‘tied’ or
‘bound’ . . . or by the use of a space where the victim is ‘locked up.’” 136 In
this case, the defendant “allowed the [victims] to remain where they were
and never forced them to move to a confined space.”137 Had the defendant
moved the victims to a confined location and physically restricted their
movement, then the enhancement would have applied.138 But the actions
here were not “even remotely similar to tying, binding, or locking up the
victims,” so the physical restraint enhancement was improper.139
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the fact that other circuits have held that
the threat of a gun, or standing by the exit with a gun, is a physical
restraint.140 But the court asserted that these actions “make explicit what is
implicit in all armed robberies: that the victims should not leave the
premises.”141 The physical restraint enhancement exists to punish
defendants for extra offenses they commit during the commission of a
crime, and the Fifth Circuit held that the presence of a weapon or blocking
of an exit is inherently a part of committing a robbery, not an extra
offense.142
D. The Seventh Circuit
In United States v. Herman, the defendant, Joshua Herman, was invited
to his future victims’ house.143 Upon arrival he noticed a handgun tucked
into the purse of one of his future victims.144 Herman asked if he could see
the gun, and the victim consented.145 Herman then drew his own revolver

134. Id. at 711.
135. Id. at 713–14.
136. Id. at 712 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154,
164 (2d Cir. 1999)).
137. Id.
138. Id.; see also United States v. Frank, 223 F. App’x 412, 413 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (finding physical restraint where defendant forced casino employees into a
manager’s office at gunpoint and instructed them not to leave).
139. Garcia, 857 F.3d at 712.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 713.
142. Id.
143. 930 F.3d 872, 873 (7th Cir. 2019).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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and ordered the victims to stay in the house and not follow him.146 He tried
to leave with his revolver and the victim’s gun.147 However, the victims
disobeyed and pursued him, resulting in Herman firing a shot at them.148
Herman was arrested and charged with multiple counts—one of which
included robbery of the victim’s gun and a two-level physical restraint
enhancement.149 Herman appealed on the basis that the district court
misapplied this enhancement.150
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the difference of opinion among
other circuits regarding this enhancement, but it ultimately adopted the
strict-interpretation approach. Relying on its precedent in United States v.
Doubet, the court stated that “simply ‘herding victims into a defined area’”
does not reach the threshold of physical restraint.151 Something more is
required. In Doubet, the defendant ordered bank employees into a back
room at gunpoint.152 He left them in a bathroom within the back room and
ordered them not to come out—the room was never locked.153 In this case,
the court held that the victims were “effectively secured by Doubet’s threats
of death while carrying the [gun],” so that constituted physical restraint.154
Though forcing the victims into a confined space is not enough for
physical restraint, the combination of Doubet’s actions with his threats that
someone was watching the door “served as a figurative lock and key
sufficient to constitute a physical restraint.”155 However, in Herman, the
defendant did not order his victims to another location—he ordered them
not to move.156 Since there was no “something more,” like the additional
threats in Doubet, the court held that this did not constitute physical
restraint.157
Comparing Doubet with Herman, it is important to distinguish that in
Doubet the victims complied with the directive and in Herman the victims
did not. The court noted that “cases that have found physical restraint have
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 875 (quoting United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Doubet, 969 F.2d at 342.
See id.
Id. at 347.
Id.
Herman, 930 F.3d at 873.
Id. at 875–77.
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focused on the action of the defendant, not on the reaction of the victim.”158
If the defendant is threatening the victim with a gun, it is ultimately up to
the victim how to respond (e.g., complying, running away). The mere
existence of the threat does not incapacitate the victims and make them
physically unable to move. For example, as noted in Herman, the victims
did not comply with the threat and pursued Herman.159 The court held that
the victim’s response does not belong “within the scope of the physical
restraint guideline.”160
The court further noted that there are other avenues to which a judge may
look to punish the defendant for the psychological harm. For instance, a
judge can consider “psychological coercion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
as part of ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense.’”161 In doing so, the
victim will get justice for psychological harm, but the defendant will not be
improperly sentenced by conflating that harm with the physical restraint
enhancement.
E. The Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Parker, Chris Parker committed a series of bank
robberies over the course of four months.162 Parker was found guilty on all
counts in the indictment for his participation in these robberies—two of
which (Counts Two and Four) included the use of a firearm.163 Because of
this, his sentence included the two-level enhancement for physical
restraint.164 For Count Two, Parker’s accomplice grabbed a bank teller by
the hair.165 The court noted that this act constituted a physical restraint, but
the question was whether Parker was liable for the actions of his
accomplice: “U.S.S.G § 1B1.3(b) (2000) holds a defendant accountable at
sentencing for all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of a jointly undertaken criminal activity.”166 The Ninth Circuit

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 876.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 877.
241 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1118.
Id.
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held that it was reasonably foreseeable that this type of restraint could
happen during a robbery, so Parker was liable for that conduct.167
The robbery at issue in Count Four involved a robber pointing a gun at a
bank teller and ordering her to the floor.168 Parker argued that this conduct
was not within the meaning of the physical restraint enhancement.169 The
court focused on the “sustained focus” standard to determine if this
enhancement was appropriate.170 This standard requires a “sustained focus
on the restrained person that lasts long enough for the robber to direct the
victim into a room or order the victim to walk somewhere.”171 The court
held that “briefly pointing a gun” at someone and giving them a command
does not constitute physical restraint.172 Additionally, there would be no
limiting principle if this were to constitute physical restraint because
“nearly all armed bank robberies will presumably involve such acts.”173
F. The D.C. Circuit
In United States v. Drew, the defendant, Wilbert Drew, broke into his
estranged wife’s house and came in through the window.174 After hearing
the sound of breaking glass, his ex-wife locked herself in the bedroom and
called 911.175 Drew broke into the bedroom and ordered her downstairs
while pointing a shotgun at her.176 He continually threatened to kill her
while forcing her downstairs.177 At one point, Drew pulled the trigger, but
167. Id.; see also United States v. Carter, 219 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Shaw, 91 F.3d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1996).
168. Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1118–19.
171. Id. at 1118.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1118–19.
174. 200 F.3d 871, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Because Drew agreed to plead guilty to
“possession of a firearm while subject to a court order,” the government dismissed all other
charges against him, including one for armed burglary. Id. However, the physical restraint
enhancement applied by the court was the exact same as the physical restraint enhancement
for robbery. Compare id. at 876 (applying the two-level enhancement under § 3A1.3 of the
Sentencing Guidelines where “a victim was physically restrained”), with U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (applying a two-level
enhancement where “any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the
offense”).
175. Drew, 200 F.3d at 875.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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the gun did not discharge.178 After this, his wife and their sons tried to
disarm him.179 The police arrived during the struggle and placed Drew
under arrest.180 He was convicted and appealed on the basis that the
physical restraint enhancement had been improperly applied.181
The D.C. Circuit held that Drew’s actions did not constitute physical
restraint for purposes of the sentencing enhancement.182 The court stated
that “[t]he most pertinent definition of ‘physical’ is ‘of the body as opposed
to the mind, as, physical exercise.’”183 The court also pointed to the
commentary of the Guidelines, which states that physical restraint incudes
acts such as “being tied, bound, or locked up.”184 This circuit interpreted the
commentary to the Guidelines to be illustrative of how a victim must be
restrained—“through bodily contact or to confine[ment] . . . in some
way.”185 While the victim may have felt restrained, “[t]he required restraint
must, as the language plainly recites, be physical.”186
Fear is not an adequate condition for the circuits that follow the strictinterpretation approach to apply the physical restraint enhancement. The
circuits in this category agree that psychological restraint is insufficient to
apply this enhancement without it being in conjunction with an actual
physical restraint. For example, the defendant does not necessarily have to
touch the victim, as noted in Copenhaver, but the actions of the defendant
must cause the victim to be physically unable to interfere with the
commission of the crime or be unable to escape. This can happen through
being tied up, bound, or moved to a specified area and confined to that
space. While those are the most common examples of physical restraint, the
list is not exhaustive. If the victim is physically affected by a direct action
of the defendant in a way that immobilizes the victim, the circuits following
this interpretation of the Guidelines will apply the physical restraint
enhancement.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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III. A Liberal Interpretation of the Physical Restraint Enhancement
Circuits in this category allow the victim’s feelings of restraint to affect
how they apply the physical restraint enhancement. The psychological
impact of the defendant’s actions on the victim matters just as much as if
they were physically restrained.
A. The First Circuit
In September 2000, Timi Wallace entered a firearms dealership, pointed
a gun at the store owner, and ordered him not to move.187 Another
employee attempted to flee the store, and Wallace’s accomplice drew his
gun and ordered her to stop.188 The accomplice then ordered the assistant to
open the gun case and proceeded to steal six high caliber handguns.189 After
they had secured the guns, Wallace and his accomplice left the store.190
Later, the store owner identified Wallace from a photograph as the man
who pointed a gun at him during the robbery.191 Wallace evaded arrest until
2004, when he was then convicted for all counts on the indictment,
including armed robbery with a two-level physical restraint enhancement.192
Wallace appealed and argued that the district court misapplied the
Guidelines.193
Wallace argued that neither he nor his accomplice physically restrained
the victims because “they did not physically touch the victims or force them
into a separate and confined space.”194 The government argued that even
without physical contact, the victims were essentially immobilized by the
defendants pointing guns at them at close range and ordering them not to
move.195 In addition to holding the victims at gun point, the First Circuit
also noted that Wallace’s accomplice “jumped in front of [the assistant]
when she tried to escape,” physically blocking her path.196 The court held
that this was physical restraint because “[k]eeping someone from doing

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

814

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:795

something is inherent within the concept of restraint.”197 Even though the
victims were not moved to another room or confined to a space, the court
held that they were effectively immobilized due to “the close proximity of
the armed robbers to the victims, and the posturing of the defendant and coconspirator when one of the victims tried to escape.”198
B. The Fourth Circuit
In United States v. Dimache, Elianer Dimache went into a bank and
asked a teller for change.199 As she was getting the change, Dimache leapt
over the counter, pointed a gun at her, and ordered her to put the money in a
bag.200 He then pointed the gun at the other tellers and ordered them to get
down on the floor.201 After that encounter, Dimache left the bank with
$1,778.202 During the investigation, police interviewed Dimache and he
denied involvement even though there was video surveillance of the
robbery.203 Eventually, he was indicted for three counts and pled guilty to
armed bank robbery.204 The probation office included the two-level physical
restraint enhancement in its sentencing report, and Dimache objected to this
provision.205 The district court overruled the objection and applied the
enhancement.206 Dimache appealed, arguing that the physical restraint
enhancement required more than pointing the gun at the tellers, ordering
them to the floor, and commanding them not to move.207
The Fourth Circuit held that the enhancement was appropriate “when the
defendant points the gun at the victim, thereby restricting the victim’s
movements and ensuring the victim’s compliance with the desires of the
defendant.”208 In reaching this decision, the Fourth Circuit relied on its
holding in United States v. Wilson. In Wilson, Wilson and his co-defendant
197. Id. at 34–35.
198. Id. at 34.
199. 665 F.3d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 2011).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 604–05.
206. Id. at 605.
207. Id. at 606.
208. Id. at 607 (citing United States v. Wilson, 198 F.3d 467, 472 (4th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 33 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327,
1329–30 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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held a victim in her car at gunpoint and prevented the victim from exiting or
starting her car until she gave them both her money and the car.209 The
court held that the victim was physically restrained and that the
“enhancement is proper ‘if the act of physical restraint adds to the basic
crime.’”210 Wilson also argued that the enhancement would result in double
counting.211 However, physical restraint is not an element of the crime of
carjacking, nor is it an element of the crime of robbery, so double counting
was not implicated in either case. In Dimache, the defendants prevented the
tellers “from both leaving the bank and thwarting the bank robbery” by
pointing guns at them, so they were effectively physically restrained.212
Dimache also argued that since the tellers were confined in a large, open
area, they were not physically restrained in the same way as the victim in
Wilson who was confined to a much smaller space: the car.213 The court
rejected this argument, stating that “[t]he size of the area is not controlling[]
because . . . [the] enhancement turns on whether the victim’s freedom of
movement was restrained.”214 The tellers’ freedom of movement was
restrained enough through the defendant’s conduct for the physical restraint
enhancement to apply.215
C. The Eighth Circuit
In United States v. Stevens, Donald Stevens and his accomplice, wearing
masks and rubber gloves, committed an armed bank robbery.216 During the
robbery, they ordered the bank employees into the breakroom at gunpoint
and forced the employees to turn over their keys and phones.217 Stevens and
his accomplice then ordered the employees into the bank vault and closed
the door—but they did not lock it.218 Stevens was caught and convicted of
armed bank robbery, and an additional two-level enhancement was applied
to his sentence for physical restraint.219 He appealed, arguing that he did not
209. Id. at 608.
210. Id. (quoting Wilson, 198 F.3d at 472).
211. Wilson, 198 F.3d at 472 n.*.
212. Dimache, 665 F.3d at 608.
213. Id. at 609.
214. Id.
215. Id. (affirming the district court’s application of the section 2B3.1(b)(4)(B)
sentencing enhancement).
216. 580 F.3d 718, 719 (8th Cir. 2009).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 719–20.
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physically restrain the employees because the vault door was never
locked.220
The Eighth Circuit disagreed. The presence of the gun combined with the
threat of “imminent bodily harm for noncompliance with their demands”
was enough to “ensure[] the employees would comply.”221 Though the door
of the vault was not locked, the court held that the threat of harm was so
significant that there was “no alternative to compliance.”222 Additionally,
the court noted that the defendants did far more than merely brandish a
weapon. They moved the victims to “two distinct locations at gun point and
closed them in a vault under circumstances clearly implying they should
remain there or risk physical harm.”223 Though the employees were not
locked in the vault, the threat of harm was so prevalent that they were
unable to escape or call for help; therefore, they were physically
restrained.224
Similarly, in United States v. Kirtley, the defendant, William Kirtley,
robbed a bank and forced the bank tellers to lie on the floor.225 He also
ordered them to tie their feet together.226 During the interaction, Kirtley
trained his gun on them and threatened to harm the tellers if they did not
comply.227 After the employees followed his orders, Kirtley stole the cash
from a drawer and fled.228 The bank employees then contacted the police
and Kirtley was arrested.229 He was convicted, and his sentence included
the two-level physical restraint enhancement.230 Kirtley appealed and
argued that the district court improperly applied the physical restraint
enhancement.231 He argued that he did not physically restrain the victims
and that “asking the tellers to tie their feet together with his materials” did
not fit within the meaning of the enhancement.232

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id.
986 F.2d 285, 285 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 286.
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Relying on the standard set in Doubet, the Eighth Circuit reiterated its
holding that “a defendant physically restrains persons if the defendant
creates circumstances allowing the persons no alternative but
compliance.”233 Due to the presence of the gun and Kirtley’s threatening
behavior, the tellers had no choice but to do as they were ordered.234 Kirtley
also argued that the bank employees were not physically restrained because
they were able to easily free themselves after he had left.235 The court
disagreed with this assertion as well, and it again relied on Doubet where
the court found that victims were physically restrained, even though they
were in an unlocked room, because the defendant’s death threats left them
no option but to comply.236 Therefore, Kirtley, by training his gun on the
victims and giving them no alternative but to comply, had physically
restrained them within the meaning of the enhancement.237
D. The Tenth Circuit
In United States v. Davis, Percy Davis and a codefendant robbed a bank
while armed with rifles.238 Davis held a teller at gunpoint while she filled a
bag with money, and the codefendant ordered everyone else to the bank
lobby at gunpoint to lie on the floor.239 Throughout the robbery, Davis and
the codefendant kept their rifles pointed at the heads of the employees and
customers.240 They were arrested and convicted, and Davis’s sentence
included the two-level enhancement for physical restraint.241 Davis
appealed, arguing that the district court improperly applied this
enhancement and that his actions did not fit within the meaning of the
enhancement.242
The Tenth Circuit relied on its precedent set in United States v. Fisher.243
In Fisher, the defendant, Ray Fisher, was the lookout for a bank robbery,
during which his co-conspirators hit a security guard with a gun and held

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. (citing United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 347 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Doubet, 969 F.2d at 347).
Id.
29 F. App’x 535, 536 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
132 F.3d 1327 (10th Cir. 1997).
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him at gunpoint for the duration of the robbery.244 The court held that
“[p]hysical restraint is not limited to physical touching of the victim . . . .
[but] occurs whenever a victim is specifically prevented at gunpoint from
moving, thereby facilitating the crime.”245 The court further noted in Fisher
that “[k]eeping someone from doing something is inherent within the
concept of restraint.”246 Thereby, Fisher established the Tenth Circuit’s
view that holding someone at gunpoint is enough restraint to apply the
physical restraint enhancement.247
Davis argued that his case was factually distinct from Fisher because
there was less “contact, compulsion, and direct physical contact” with the
victims than in Fisher.248 The court rejected this argument and stated that
those specific factors are irrelevant in the physical restraint analysis.249
Again, the psychological coercion of the victims feeling like their freedom
was restricted was an adequate restraint for the Tenth Circuit to hold that
the physical restraint enhancement should apply.250
E. The Eleventh Circuit
In United States v. Jones, Keyvee Jones and his codefendants entered a
bank brandishing weapons and ordered the tellers to empty their cash
drawers.251 They then ordered the branch manager to open the safe.252 After
they collected the cash, the robbers ordered the customers and employees
into the vault, closed the door, and left.253 After the robbers’ departure, one
of the victims opened the vault and called for help.254 Jones and the
codefendants then led police on a high-speed chase and escaped.255 Finally,
Jones was arrested a few weeks after the robbery.256 Jones was convicted,
and his sentence included the two-level enhancement for physical
244. Id. at 1328.
245. Davis, 29 F. App’x at 537 (first alteration in original) (quoting Fisher, 132 F.3d at
1329–30).
246. Fisher, 132 F.3d at 1330.
247. See id.
248. Davis, 29 F. App’x at 537.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. 32 F.3d 1512, 1514–15 (11th Cir. 1994).
252. Id. at 1515.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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restraint.257 He appealed this enhancement, claiming that the evidence did
not prove that he had physically restrained anyone during the robbery.258
The Eleventh Circuit held that this too was physical restraint.259 In
evaluating what constitutes physical restraint, the court noted that “[t]he use
of the modifier ‘such as’ in the [Guidelines commentary] indicates that the
illustrations of physical restraint ‘are listed by way of example rather than
limitation.’”260 Like the other circuits that apply a more liberal
interpretation of this enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit held that a victim is
physically restrained if the defendant has “create[d] circumstances allowing
the persons no alternative but compliance.”261 The defendants “restricted
their victims’ mobility and capacity to observe events to facilitate the
robbery.”262 Even if no threats were made, the “obvious presence of
handguns ensured the victims’ compliance and effectively prevented them
from leaving the room.”263 The presence of the guns sufficiently
immobilized the victims, so the court held the physical restraint
enhancement was appropriate.264
IV. Conflict and Resolution
The circuits that hold a strict interpretation of the physical restraint
enhancement worry that expanding this enhancement to include
psychological restraint would cause the two-level enhancement to apply to
virtually all robberies.265 It would, in effect, cause physical restraint to
become an element of the crime of robbery. However, as the Fifth Circuit
noted in Garcia, the presence of a gun is standard procedure for most
robberies.266 Further, this view holds that in determining if physical

257. Id. at 1518.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1519.
260. Id. at 1518 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319,
320–21 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).
261. Id. at 1519 (quoting United States v. Kirtley, 986 F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam)).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017); Rosario, 7 F.3d at
321; United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bell,
947 F.3d 49, 57 (3d Cir. 2020).
266. Garcia, 857 F.3d at 713.
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restraint occurred, a court must look to the actions of the defendants, and
not to the reaction of the victims.267
The circuits that apply a more liberal interpretation and allow
psychological restraint to qualify for the enhancement state that when a
person is being threatened with a gun, they are, in effect, restrained.268 It is
arguable that most people will comply under that very real threat of
physical harm. This threat then restricts the victims’ freedom because they
are unable (or unwilling) to try to escape or prevent the facilitation of the
crime.269 However, that is not an absolute guarantee, as seen by the victims’
response in Herman.270
The issue with these conflicting interpretations is that it offers two very
different sentencing schemes for very similar crimes. This is exactly what
the SRA sought to prevent.271 If a defendant is in a strict interpretation
circuit and brandished a gun during a robbery, he will not receive that twolevel enhancement. But if he is in a liberal interpretation circuit, he will. For
an example of the significance of a two-level enhancement, consider the
sentencing in United States v. Stevens. The defendant, Donald Stevens,
committed a bank robbery during which he ordered the employees into the
vault at gunpoint but did not lock it.272 Without the physical restraint
enhancement, his guideline range was forty-six to fifty-seven months’
incarceration.273 This enhancement, along with the defendant’s other
applicable enhancements and criminal history, increased the guideline
range to fifty-seven to seventy-one months’ incarceration.274 That is an
increase of fourteen months, not because of the crime’s severity, but
because of the circuit in which the defendant committed the crime.
The solution is not to ignore the use of firearms during a robbery, but to
create uniformity among how the circuits apply this specific enhancement
to reduce the ongoing sentencing disparity. In fact, there is a solution for
the use of a firearm during a robbery, outside of the physical restraint
enhancement, already established in the Guidelines. Notably, there is a
267. United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019).
268. See Jones, 32 F.3d at 1519; United States v. Stevens, 580 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008).
269. See, e.g., Jones, 32 F.3d at 1519.
270. Herman, 930 F.3d at 876 (observing that the defendant’s threats did not prevent the
victims from following him).
271. See Cohen, supra note 38, at 74.
272. Stevens, 580 F.3d at 719.
273. Id. at 720.
274. Id.
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specific enhancement in the robbery guideline for discharging a firearm,
using a firearm, and brandishing or possessing a firearm.275 Each of these
enhancements requires a higher increase than the two-level increase
required by the physical restraint enhancement. They are respectively
seven-level, six-level, and five-level enhancements.276 This provides an
avenue for courts to punish use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery,
without relying on conflicting interpretations of the physical restraint
enhancement.
Specifically, with regard to the conflicting interpretations of what
constitutes physical restraint, the circuits should all adopt the strict, textual
interpretation. The case that guides the reasoning for adopting this approach
is United States v. Herman. There, the Seventh Circuit makes clear that a
criminal defendant should only be punished for the acts they committed,
and not for the reactions of their victims.277 This is an important
consideration because each person may react differently to being held at
gunpoint.278 The Seventh Circuit states that “the victim’s reaction does not
determine whether there is or is not physical restraint.”279 The victim’s
reaction to the defendant’s psychological coercion or restraint “is not
something that logically belongs within the scope of the physical-restraint
guideline.”280
While it is arguable that most people would comply, the victims in
Herman proved that the mere threat of violence does not literally
immobilize a victim to the point of being physically restrained.281 To
promote the kind of consistency and fairness that the Guidelines seek to
impose on sentencing, it is necessary to take into account only the
defendant’s actions.282 By focusing on the defendant’s actions, there would
be more uniformity in sentencing because the Guidelines are specifically
tailored to account for the defendant’s conduct, not the victim’s reaction.283
275. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
276. Id.
277. United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.5, intro. cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(“In determining the type of sentence to impose, the sentencing judge should consider the
nature and seriousness of the [offender’s] conduct . . . and the pertinent offender
characteristics.” (emphases added)).
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There is no separate category in the Guidelines for a victim’s responses to a
defendant’s actions.284 There are only categories of criminal offenses that
encapsulate criminal conduct.285 Therefore, when considering an
appropriate sentence, the court should only evaluate the conduct of the
defendant.
When there are conflicting interpretations among the circuits with
respect to a particular guideline or enhancement, the Commission has the
ability to amend the Sentencing Guidelines without necessarily having to
wait for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to hear such a case.286 “The
Commission has the authority to submit guideline amendments each year to
Congress between the beginning of a regular Congressional session and
May 1.”287 Congress has made the Commission a permanent agency to
continually evaluate and modify sentencing practices to further the mission
of establishing a uniform, fair, and certain sentencing scheme.288
As the Fifth Circuit noted in Hickman, to allow the physical restraint
enhancement to apply only when a victim is threatened with a gun would
essentially add an element to the crime of robbery because “there would be
no limiting principle on the application of this enhancement.”289 To avoid
this conflict, the Guidelines should be amended to specify that the restraint
must be actual physical contact between the defendant and the victim, not
merely psychological anguish or coercion.
The Commission could add language to the physical restraint
enhancement to establish this. For example, it could change the

284. The Guidelines include a section called “Victim-Related Adjustments.” Id. § 3A.
This section does not account for the victim’s reaction to a crime. Rather, it provides a
category for types of victims (e.g., “Vulnerable Victim” for a minority victim of a racially
hate crime, “Official Victim” for a government official victim of a crime). See id. § 3A1.1–
.2. These categories go to the status of the victim, but not their response to the defendant’s
actions.
285. See id. § 2A–2X (listing crimes under U.S.S.C. Chapter 2, “Offense Conduct”).
286. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991) (“The Commission [has] . . . [a]
statutory duty ‘periodically [to] review and revise’ the Guidelines.” (last alteration in
original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(o))); see also Elliot Edwards, Note, Eliminating CircuitSplit Disparities in Federal Sentencing Under the Post-Booker Guidelines, 92 IND. L.J. 817,
825–26 (2017).
287. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, statutory mission.
288. Id.
289. United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461–62 (5th Cir. 1998), reh’g granted and
vacated, United States v. Hickman, 165 F.3d 1020 (5th Cir. 1999), aff’d in part and vacated
in part, United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999).
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enhancement290 to read “if any person was physically restrained through
direct physical contact with the perpetrator, increase by 2 levels.”
Alternatively, the Commission could provide commentary to section 2B3.1
instructing courts to use the firearm provision (section 2B3.1(b)(2)) in all
instances in which a firearm is present during a robbery.291 Either of these
amendments would clarify the interpretation of physical restraint and solve
the inconsistent application of this enhancement.
V. Conclusion
It is likely that some form of sentencing disparity will exist until the end
of time, and there is simply no way to create a list of all possible crime
variations. However, it is possible for courts to reduce disparity for
particular crimes, such as those discussed in this Comment, if they can
agree on an interpretation. The interpretation of the physical restraint
enhancement that most closely aligns with the goals of the SRA is the strict,
literal interpretation. It is clearer that physical restraint occurs when a
defendant uses direct contact to restrict a victim’s movement. It is, of
course, more difficult to glimpse inside a victim’s head to ascertain her
mental state during a past event. As noted in United States v. Herman, the
threat of a gun does not always effectively immobilize the victim—the
victim still technically can fight back.292 Further, to create a certain and fair
sentencing scheme, the criminal justice system should seek to punish the
defendants for their actions, not their victims’ reactions.
Heather Crabill

290. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (“[I]f any person was
physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase
by 2 levels.”).
291. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2).
292. 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019).
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